Introduction
The relationship between the European Union 1 and Africa has been formalised since the beginning of the European integration project in the evolving Yaoundé, Lomé and now Cotonou Agreements. The relationship has shifted in line with the emerging global framework for neoliberal accumulation. This shift has involved the 're-designing' of developmental strategies and their 'locking-in' in the long term.
Theoretically, this global shift in the organisation of both production and social relations (including popular understandings) has been well documented and the changing dominant patterns of production in advanced industrial economies has been highlighted at length. However, this article aims to develop further the idea of 'locking-in', outlined in the work of Stephen Gill, and to place an increased emphasis on the phenomena of both re-designing and locking-in as they apply to the alteration of developmental strategies in Less Developed Countries 4 Gill 1998. 5 Gill 1998, p. 1. 6 Gill 1998, p. 4. have to prove the credibility and consistency of their policies to secure the confidence of capital markets. 4 Gill takes this analysis further, abstracting it to the global level and arguing that, in an era of disciplinary neoliberalism, this structural power is increasingly being written into legal and quasi-constitutional arrangements that extend between states and multilateral institutions and more nebulous rules-based frameworks, creating what he refers to as a 'new constitutionalism'. For Gill, the new constitutionalism is not only reflective of the hegemony of capital over labour, but of a specific form of hegemony, influenced by the policy dictates of neoliberalism and crucially offering a privileged position to specific classes and class factions:
. . . new constitutionalism operates in practice to confer privileged rights of citizenship and representation to corporate capital and large investors. What is being attempted is the creation of a political economy and social order where public policy is premised upon the dominance of the investor, and reinforcing the protection of his/her property rights. The mobile investor becomes the sovereign political subject. 5 Gill draws heavily on Gramsci's notion of hegemony, as being self-reflexive, actively constructed and incorporating both consensual and coercive features.
Neoliberal hegemony, Gill argues, is characterised by the pursuit of measures to 'reconfigure' state apparatuses, and construct markets and measures to deal with the dislocations created by the circulation of fictitious commodities.
This last category of characteristics of neoliberal hegemony draws significantly upon Polyani's idea of the 'double movement' to both extend commodification and socialise the core elements of capitalist production, and can be broken down into three sub-categories. These are: measures to protect against the contradictions generated by the commodification of capital, to contain the contradictions created by the commodification of land (that is, sustainable development and other aspects of environmental protection), and measures to contain the effects of the commodification of labour. 6 Clearly, however, if the 'locking-in' of the policy prescriptions of neoliberal hegemony is to take this form, then the structural power of capital over the state must be significantly modified to allow the state to secure the necessary 7 Cammack 2003, pp. 41-2. 8 Marx and Engels 1985, p. 90 . 9 Poulantzas 2000, p. 127. 10 Cammack 2003. conditions for the reproduction of accumulation. Conceptually, this can be accounted for via an understanding of the concept of the relative autonomy of the state. This autonomy is possible, first, because various factions of capital themselves do not share a singular and unified set of interests beyond the structural dominance of capital over labour, and, second, by the reality of class struggle in which the state becomes a mediating institution between capital and labour: 7 This organisation of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between workers themselves. But it ever rises up again, stronger, firmer, mightier. It compels legislative recognition of particular interests of the workers, by taking advantage of the divisions among the bourgeoisie itself. Thus the ten hours bill in England was carried. 8 At any one time, then, the state has varying degrees of freedom from individual fractions of capital and can broker alliances to intervene in the structural base of the economy.
The state is able to play this role in organising and unifying the bourgeoisie and the power of the bloc in so far as it enjoys relative autonomy of given fractions and components, and of various political interests. Such autonomy is indeed constitutive of the capitalist state: it refers to the state's materiality as an apparatus relatively separated from the relations of production, and to the specificity of classes and class struggle under capitalism that is implicit in that separation. 9
Paul Cammack 10 has recently applied this concept to the governance of global capitalism, in which organisations and networks of organisations embody the political autonomy conferred upon the state at the domestic level and explains the conceptual underpinnings of the new constitutionalism. At this level, relatively autonomous political authority takes shape in organisations and institutions, more nebulous régimes of rules, dominant ideas and in the form of multilateral treaties and agreements. Each of these operates at a variety of spatial levels. This is the first dimension of locking-in and focuses analytical attention on the role of the management of global capitalism at various spatial abstractions such as the global, macro-regional (that is, Europe, East Asia, and so forth), national and sub-national levels, down to communities, families and individuals.
The second dimension of 'locking-in' is demonstrated by giving more explicit recognition to what is often implicit in Gill's work: that locking-in extends beyond the process of the formal constitutionalism that he identifies, encompassing the requirements of neoliberal accumulation across a range of 'pillars' of hegemony. These include a technical/legal pillar, a social/sociopsychological pillar and a political/institutional pillar.
In a technical-legal sense, locking-in involves the reconstruction of legal frameworks which protect the rights of capital over a long and often defined period. This is manifest for instance, in contract and property law (including intellectual property) designed to guard against the expropriations that had marked dependency and Keynesian-inspired development policies. This technical-legal aspect is explicitly linked to change in the political and institutional pillar. The result is to promote and build the interests of investors into the rules of the system itself and therefore remove them from the everyday political agenda. Crucially, such political change is intended to prevent an easy (re)turn to alternatives to neoliberalism. This pillar is also the site of reform of welfare systems and other institutions designed to mediate the negative effects of accumulation and contain elements of the class compromise that might otherwise drop out of the formal capitalist economy. The reform of social systems in this way has been critical in the transition between the early phase of neoliberal reform, focusing on austerity-based deconstruction of prior structures of more developmental and Keynesian political economy, and more recent reforms designed to expand the available pool of labour and, more crucially, shift the focus of intervention to relative surplus-value generation.
Social/socio-psychological locking-in refers to the management of social practices, norms and expectations. For instance, throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank often remarked on the importance of downgrading the expectations of subordinate social groups and classes for redistribution of the social surplus of production.
Again, this example demonstrates how locking-in within each of the pillars of hegemony combines and relate to one another. Socio/psychological lockingin clearly relates to measures to undermine redistribution, either privately 11 World Bank 1991, p. 117. 12 European Commission 1992, pp. 8-11. Emphasis ours. 13 While the informal economy may be capitalist too, it is difficult for political authority to manage and regulate and as such exists on the margins of hegemony outside of the direct scope of measures to increase commodification and to contain its contradictions. through measures to lower wages relative to surpluses, or publicly through measures to cut taxation and public spending. Both in the core and periphery, this initially involved 'austerity' measures, including 'cold bath' reductions in employment and public spending. As the World Bank and European Commission have remarked illustratively of the transition economies of Eastern Europe, the socio-psychological 'shock' of crisis is an important part of this process:
Rapid action can improve the political sustainability of reform if it prevents a joint assault by special interest groups. . . . Bold changes are especially necessary if a government lacks credibility. . . . A conclusive reform can help to reshape expectations about the government's commitment and so contribute to its success. Governments do well to capitalize on the broad, potentially short lived mandate for reform that crisis confers by front loading the reform program. 11
Protracted and endemic shortages, inflation and hyperinflation are a great problem but also mollify the population and reduce popular resistance to shock therapy . . . unpopular measures should not be spread over time but taken as quickly as possible. 12 Again, austerity-based adjustments to social expectations form part of the early phase of constructing neoliberal hegemony, with the major part of the focus on deconstruction of earlier manifestations of an alternative developmental hegemony. More recently, locking-in has developed a more sophisticated approach, mediated through the ideology of the Third Way, promoted by strategically important politicians and states. In terms of social practices and expectations, this phase has not merely focused on coercive aspects of locking-in but has sought also to mobilise consensual strategies. Shaped against the backdrop of fear of resistance to structural adjustment and the rise of 'dropping out' of the formal economy, 13 these strategies have become a major element in the drive to expand and lock-in commodification, particularly with regard to expanding the pool of available, 14 Critical to these measures are understandings developed in bourgeois scholarship around the interaction of labour with capital and the ability to generalise and take up new production techniques and technologies. For more work on 'endogenous growth theory', particularly on innovation and learning by doing, see Kaldor and Mirlees 1962, Arrow 1962 . 15 Gill 1999. 
EU-African relations
The relationship between the EU and Africa dates back to the creation of the EC, with Part IV of the 1957 Treaty of Rome outlining the framework for 'association' between the two regions, based on reciprocal preferential trade and aid provisions. 16 This framework was modified by the two successive Yaoundé Conventions (1963-9 and 1969-74) African states controlled significant energy resources. Nigeria was the world's eighth largest oil producer, whilst the Congo, Gabon, Zaire, and Trinidad controlled 1,300 million tons of proven oil resources. Oil companies were exploring the Cameroon, Dahomey, Ghana, Senegal and Ethiopia. In light of increased European reliance on nuclear energy, uranium supplies were of growing importance and were present throughout Central Africa, with Gabon, Niger, the Central African Republic and Zaïre all actually producing uranium. Gruhn 1976, p. 259 . Furthermore ACP states were important hosts for European investment, particularly from the former metropoles whose corporations often enjoyed monopolies in the exploitation of mineral wealth. For example, the French government owned seventy per cent of the capital of the Equatorial Africa Oil Company (SPAFE) which exploited deposits in the Congo and Gabon, and the French Atomic Energy Commission had a one-third interest in the Air Mines Company (SOMAIR) created in 1967 to exploit Niger's uranium deposits. The French government was also involved in mining bauxite in the Cameroon, manganese in Gabon and potash in the Congo. Ravenhill 1985, p. 37. 21 In reflection of the UN General Assembly's 1974 Programme of Action for a New International Economic Order. 22 Crucial to this was the demonstration of a 'locked-in' commitment to marketbased development.
Most recently, through the Cotonou Agreement, the EU-ACP relationship has formally become part of a Third-Way-inspired global poverty reduction strategy, embracing social and economic reform in partnership with the institutions of global economic governance. The EU and its member states are major creditors and donors to the IMF and World Bank-led Highly Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, and the accompanying poverty reduction strategies. 27 The inclusion within Cotonou of an EU-ACP agreement to cooperate on debt relief issues follows Council guidelines in 1996 which outlined dominant themes in European development policy:
The policy in this area is a decisive factor in ensuring, in the context of tight and efficient public finance management, a fair distribution of the fruits of 
Locking-in
Central to the neoliberal re-designing project have been locking-in strategies, which are essential to secure such policy orientations over the long term. The most obvious evidence of locking-in has been the creation and maintenance of the Lomé/Cotonou relationship itself, by which ACP states have committed themselves to a particular development framework under the management of the EU. Locking-in has also been pursued through the increasing conditionality attached to the provisions of the Conventions. This is an effective 30 See IMF 1983. 31 In contrast to the previous system, whereby the ACP state exchanged views with the EC on development objectives and priorities, under Lomé III the European Commission became involved in the preparatory stage. The Commission and main providers of aid assess the ACP states' economic and social situation, and identify focal sectors. Veiled in terms of increased efficiency, flexibility and co-ordination, the Commission's remit was extended to the allocation of funds to individual states, the identification of sectors and programmes and policy implementation. 31 The shift from the project-oriented approach to support for priority sectors or development 'themes' allowed the EC to expand its decisionmaking role and re-design those parts of the ACP economies it wished to promote. Historically, the EC had been extremely selective in terms of recipient sectors and states. Little aid was given to support the production of goods that might compete with European products, consequently, industrial funding focused on energy supplies. Under Lomé I, over forty per cent of rural funds were allocated to large agro-industrial projects, concentrating heavily on primary export crops, with only a tiny sum allocated to value-added agricultural and food processing. 32 However, as the Convention matured, increasing focus was given to facilitating local processing, enabling the management of integrated production chains and the development of supportive class alliances.
Building on the sectoral approach, a specific structural adjustment support facility was included in Lomé IV (1989) which was described as the first comparison to the loans offered by other donors. In 1991, structural adjustment funds were withheld from fifteen states due to failure to adopt a satisfactory economic reform programme, demonstrating that conditionality was underpinned by effective disciplinary sanctions. 34 Conditionality was formally extended in 1995 to the observance of human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles, using the twin tools of a suspension mechanism and special allocations to bring Lomé further in line with the wider global development framework and demonstrating both a consensual and coercive aspect to the process. 35 The inclusion of 'political conditionality' into the Convention demonstrates mechanisms of technical/legal and political/ institutional locking-in. This was carried forward to the Cotonou Agreement along with a greater emphasis on efficiency and hence an enhanced role for the European Commission in project preparation and appraisal, particularly through the introduction of performance-related tranching of disbursements.
Various measures within the Lomé/Cotonou relationship demonstrate the technical/legal elements of locking-in, in order to protect the position of capital over the long term and ensure a secure investment environment. The Lomé Convention developed an investment framework which was hailed as 'unprecedented in similar multilateral agreements', 36 and aimed to encourage fair and equitable treatment for investors, clear, stable and predictable investment conditions including insurance and guarantee systems. To complement the framework, the EC accorded itself a facilitating role in extending investment. In the late 1970s, such a role had been demanded by a consortium of mining companies in response to the rapid decline of European investment in Third-World mining, due in part to increased state control. 37 The request to provide investment stabilisation and protection frameworks in turn prompted the Commission to urge other institutions, such as the 38 Long 1980, p. 123. 39 European Commission 2000, part 1:4, article 23. 40 The Commission estimated that an energy gap would emerge in the 1980s due to scarcity of uranium and oil, threatening the survival of European industry. European Commission 1979a, p. xxv. A central concern was that mineral supply would shift from Africa to the USA, Canada and Australia, which were much stronger bargaining partners, or to third countries where other industrialised mineral users represented more powerful competition.
World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, to widen their stabilisation efforts. 38 The EC's investment facilitating role was explicitly outlined as helping ACP states to re-design their domestic economies to facilitate access to capital markets and encourage direct private European investment particularly through sub-and joint-contracting. 39 With the promotion and facilitation of private foreign investment to the ACP, European development policy was explicitly presented as a vehicle for the extension of European capital in an increasingly competitive global economy while assuring secure and diverse supplies of raw materials, particularly energy. 40 The desire to stimulate European economic growth converged with the needs of capital to secure the most profitable locations in terms of market access, production costs, raw materials and labour. Augmenting the contractual mechanisms that ensured the technical/legal elements of locking-in to secure favourable investment conditions was the inclusion of human rights as a fundamental principle explicitly linked to development, particularly the rights of the individual in comparison to notions of group and socio-economic rights.
The Lomé/Cotonou relationship has also featured socio-psychological elements of locking-in. Early neoliberal conditionalities attached to structural adjustment policies have not only ensured the political and institutional aspect of locking-in, but have also had a psychological effect on society. Austerity has shaped citizens' expectations of the state and is crucial to the project to dismantle prior forms of political economy. Under Lomé III, the move to a framework promoting re-designing, the privileging of private enterprise and the restoration of credit worthiness through export production included the imposition of such austerity measures. However, the locking-in of neoliberal hegemony has not merely been coercive. The realisation that the hard medicine of structural adjustment could engender social unrest, prompted the EU to develop a role under Lomé IV as supporter of Bretton-Woods-designed policies of reform. As such, it sought to mitigate the effects of enforced public spending cuts and liberalisation to ensure 'that the social repercussions are tolerable believing as it does that social development is an integral part of economic progress and the promotion of civil society and democracy in Africa'. 41 This role, described as that of 'social fire-brigade' by Hewitt, 42 included increased support for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and micro-projects, and directing adjustment funds to public services, especially health and education. Political and social sustainability was to be ensured through decentralised co-operation and participation reflecting the increasingly ThirdWay developmental approach. 43 In sum, the reconfiguration of the EU-ACP relationship has fitted with the evolution of the global development framework which has, in turn, been 
Locking-in as a multi-levelled project
Locking-in is a complex and multi-levelled project that encompasses a host of co-ordinated institutions and agreements at and between the global, macro-44 See Gill 1999. 45 Hewitt 1989, p. 308. regional, national and sub-state levels. 44 The latest phase of the EU-ACP relationship has demonstrated coherence with the global development framework by becoming an explicit facet of that strategy. This reflects the ongoing expansion of the partnership, not only through the accession of member states to each group, but also through the inclusion of other institutions.
Since the late 1970s, the EU has sought to include private investors and financial institutions in the Lomé relationship in order to fund joint projects, supplement stabilisation efforts and help spread risk. Contributors to these 'triangular financing' schemes were individual member states and the World Bank, as well as OPEC investors in the late 1970s who were eager to recycle petro-dollars. Despite ACP rejection of closer co-operation with the Bretton Woods institutions, European policy has increasingly been made in coordination with them 'in the interests of policy effectiveness and of Western co-ordination and solidarity'. 45 This was particularly evident in the 1989 and 1995 Lomé Conventions, which clearly reflected World Bank structural adjustment programmes, a set of policies that have long been a tool to enforce re-designing, and institutionalised the inclusion of a social dimension to reforms. Through this process, the EU, in conjunction with the Bretton Woods institutions, sought to play two complementary roles, as both supporter and enforcer of structural adjustment policies.
Regionalism and the new constitutionalism
The correlation between European and global development frameworks as displayed through the Cotonou Agreement is further demonstrated in the shared strategy to achieve WTO compliance, namely the creation of EPAs.
As such, it is a clear indication of the inter-linkages between global and regional frameworks, through cross-cutting ties of a political, economic and bureaucratic nature, and the complementary nature of locking-in strategies pursued at global, regional, state and sub-state levels. provides a mechanism to lock-in the neoliberal development model into both the state and civil society, providing the necessary political anchorage to institutionalise the dominance of capital over the long term.
SADC exemplifies this new regionalism and specifically seeks to adjust developmental needs to the challenges of the liberalised global economy through a regional framework for development, diversification, productivity and export capacity. Central to this strategy is to increase the ability of the region to attract capital by displaying opportunities for trade and investment. 50 However, in practice, regional integration under the leadership of South Africa, has meant the penetration of the region by South-African and international capital, under the leadership of the South-African government 51 Taylor 1999, p. 4. 52 Keet 1999, p. 1; Chazan et al. 1999, p. 315 The new chapter regarding micro-projects under Lomé II was aimed at small rural projects and was funded by a tripartite structure in which EDF funding was matched by the ACP states and the recipient group. Therefore, such projects were dependent on close local capital/state interaction, and limited to relatively integrated social groups. 60 This approach correlated with that of the leading international organisations. Jean-Jacques Oeschlin, chairman of the International Organisation of Employers and vice-chairman of the ILO board, described the role of the SMEs as threefold: first, as an element of control in the national economy, operating as employers and operators in regions that large organised firms sometimes cannot reach due to cost; second, a channel for adaptable technology; and, third, a transmission shaft between highly organised MNCs and the informal sector, working in tandem with large enterprise through sub-contracting. This followed the example of Japan, where large MNCs partnered a constellation of small sub-contracting firms. Oeschlin identified Africa as a region where MNCs did not, but could with encouragement, sub-contract and form partnerships with local enterprise. European Commission 1984, p. 32. and politicians. To do so, Lomé provisions sought to encourage the creation of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and micro-projects that could enter into joint ventures with European capital. 59 Through such schemes as subcontracting agricultural processing and partnerships between European and local enterprises, SMEs can become vehicles for the strengthening of integrated transnational production. 60 The focus has been on the widespread adoption of an economic development model designed to strengthen market forces, increase competition and refocus the role of the state as an enabler and contractor rather than a direct economic agent. The private sector is perceived as an engine of economic growth in the ACP countries and its development has been closely associated with the achievement of the major objectives of development co-operation, such as sustainable economic and social development, integration into the world economy and poverty alleviation. As such, the Lomé/Cotonou relationship has helped to promote the necessary elements of global neoliberal accumulation.
In support of a nascent enterprise culture, the Lomé Convention included a focus on enterprise development, aimed at restructuring the productive base of the ACP. The particular emphasis on the local processing, marketing, distribution and transport of raw materials represented a combination of ACP concern for local processing and the promotion of opportunities for European investment. In 1998, the Commission introduced a new strategy for privatesector development in the ACP, in order to provide a more co-ordinated and comprehensive approach to the specific constraints of the ACP countries and regions. links between social and economic partners. There is also a continuation of the desire to prevent and mitigate the social conflict that might arise from re-designing and locking-in. The expectation is that such a strategy would produce the supportive political coalitions and stability necessary for the continued expansion and reproduction of capital. 64 Additionally, supportive measures included the targeting of adjustment funds to social services, especially health and education. 65 This strategy has been augmented under the Cotonou Agreement to include provisions related to peace building and conflict prevention which aim to secure conditions for investment and accumulation. Again, this fits with the broader global development agenda and in respect to the liberalisation of public services (under the General Agreement on Trade in Services in the WTO) is noticeably similar to UK government attempts to make its domestic markets a home for a newly emerging band of service companies. In this context, provisions globally and within the Cotonou relationship to link liberalisation and institutional redesigning of the state around the enabling model may appear to be an attempt to make the world safe for European capital. As Cammack has argued, with reference to the title of an influential UK Department for International Development White Paper, other measures to secure investment conditions at the same time as the adoption of pro-poor policies and poverty reduction look rather like an attempt to make 'the poor work for globalisation '. 66 Poverty reduction, or, in the case of the UK, 'elimination', is a crucial element of class politics not only within the EU-ACP relationship but between the developed and developing world more generally. It has become the dominant theme of World Bank development programmes, as contained within the World Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy approach and NEPAD, and is focused particularly on completing the world market for labour. 67 The vehicle for poverty reduction is portrayed as increased integration in the global economy through trade and capital liberalisation and attracting inward investment through an enabling state capable of providing an attractive, compliant and skilled workforce. 68 The result, globally, is to guarantee an excess supply of labour in the interests of maintaining an adequate and sufficiently pliant global workforce for integrated transnational production with an internally competitive, and thus fragmentary, dynamic designed to boost and secure absolute surplus-value.
Measures to improve the quality of labour inputs aim to complement this by raising the rate of relative surplus-value.
Conclusion
The evolution of the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements has complemented the global shift to neoliberal accumulation. Through these agreements, the EU has played a lead role in re-designing the development strategies of African states and has been central to the 'locking-in' project that enshrines those re-designed strategies into technical-legal, political-institutional, sociopsychological frameworks at a host of levels, including domestic political economies and inter-regional agreements. The way in which these levels overlap and fit together is central 
